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Resource heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation
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Although social structure is known to promote cooperation, by locally exposing selﬁsh agents
to their own deeds, studies to date assumed that all agents have access to the same level of
resources. This is clearly unrealistic. Here we ﬁnd that cooperation can be maintained when
some agents have access to more resources than others. Cooperation can then emerge even
in populations in which the temptation to defect is so strong that players would act fully
selﬁshly if their resources were distributed uniformly. Resource heterogeneity can thus be
crucial for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We also show that resource
heterogeneity can hinder cooperation once the temptation to defect is signiﬁcantly lowered.
In all cases, the level of cooperation can be maximized by managing resource heterogeneity.
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T
he emergence of cooperation in human and animal
societies continues to intrigue evolutionary biologists1
and sociologists. The fundamental social dilemma
underlying the tragedy of the commons2 is described by the
Public Good Game (PGG)2. In the PGG, each of the n players has
a budget R1 of resources, from which he or she can contribute to a
common pool that promotes a public good. The pooled resources
are multiplied by r (1orrn) and are divided evenly among all
players (r thus measures the gains from promoting the public
good). When the group consists only of two players (n¼ 2) and a
player can either cooperate by investing all personal resources
into the common pool, or defect by investing none, this yields the
following payoffs, denoted in analogy with the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD)3: T¼R1þR1r/2, R¼R1r, P¼R1 and S¼R1r/2.
After rescaling (by setting the baseline and unit of payoffs to R1r/2)
and substituting r¼ 2/b, this gives T¼ b, R¼ 1, P¼ b 1 and
S¼ 0, which is a special case (sometimes called ‘additive’) of the
payoff structure of the PD4. Here the temptation to defect is
measured by b 1; even though the players are always best-off
collectively when they cooperate, if b41 then an individual
player will obtain a higher payoff by not contributing, no matter
what the other players do. Therefore, defection is the
evolutionarily stable strategy in this game. Although the PGG
and PD illustrate that cooperators are prone to exploitation and
that adaptation will favour free riders, ample examples of
altruistic behaviour exist in human societies5 and among other
organisms6,7.
To overcome this incongruity, the simple PGG model can be
extended and made more realistic in a variety of ways. For
example, repeated interactions and conditional strategies8,
voluntary participation9, costly punishment of defectors10, conﬁne-
ment to groups11 and elevated mortality of defectors under adverse
environmental conditions12,13, have all been shown to facilitate
the spread and maintenance of cooperators. Furthermore, em-
bedding the cooperation game in ecological interactions may
enable individuals to escape the dilemma14,15. Another notable
extension situates players in physical space or on a social network;
in such structured populations, cooperators can spread and persist
if the temptation to defect is not too large4,16–18. The reason is that
local interactions cause defectors to suffer from their own deeds;
they can locally spread by exploiting cooperators, but then end up
mostly interacting with other defectors, which drastically reduces
the advantages of defection. Conversely, cooperators will mostly
interact with other cooperators, which increase their payoff.
Recently, interaction topologies other than regular graphs have
been explored19, and it was shown that heterogeneous degree
distributions facilitate the spread of cooperators20.
Interestingly, previous analyses of the PGG always assumed
that all players in a locale have access to the same level of
resources. Therefore, the implications for cooperation of hetero-
geneity in the resource access, or wealth, of players have so far
remained unexplored. For example, articles in a recent special
issue in the Journal of Theoretical Biology devoted to cooperation
studies do not touch this subject21. Although the effect of
diversity in social structure22 and of temporally variable resource
availability for an entire population23 are discussed, the
fundamental question of how the diversity of resource
availabilities within a population affects the level of cooperation
has not yet been addressed. As uneven distributions of resources
or wealth are ubiquitous, and as resource heterogeneity has
already been shown to have an effect in a model of mutualism24
between two different species, there is every reason to examine
how evolutionarily stable levels of cooperation are inﬂuenced by
resource heterogeneity.
The notion of pooling and dividing resources in the PGG
naturally generalizes to heterogeneous environments. We assume
that each player has access to an amount of either R1 or R2 of
resources (with R24R1). Depending on a player’s strategy, these
resources can be either pooled (cooperator) or retained (defector).
As before, the pooled resources are multiplied by r, with each
participating player receiving half of the result. Only two
parameters sufﬁce to characterize this game (for details, see the
derivation of the payoff matrix in the Methods section): b¼ 2/r
(1obo2) and c¼ (R2R1)/R1, with b 1 measuring, as before,
the temptation to defect and c measuring the wealth contrast
between players on rich and poor sites. We consider a population
of interacting and competing players that is spatially distributed
on a square lattice, with rich and poor sites allocated at random
and the fraction of rich sites given by p; players interact with their
four nearest neighbours (other interaction structures are also
explored).
We show that cooperation can be facilitated when some agents
have access to more resources than others. Cooperation can then
emerge even in populations in which the temptation to defect is
so strong that agents would act selﬁshly if their resource access
were uniform. However, resource heterogeneity can also hinder
cooperation once the temptation to defect is signiﬁcantly lowered.
Our results thus demonstrate how managing resource hetero-
geneity can be crucial for safeguarding the emergence and
maintenance of cooperation.
Results
At high temptation, heterogeneity facilitates cooperation. Our
results show that given the same high level of temptation to defect
(corresponding to relatively low gains from promoting the public
good), cooperators persist in the heterogeneous environment
(Fig. 1b) even if they would go extinct in a homogeneous
environment (b 140.25) (ref. 25, Fig. 1a). In fact, a little bit of
heterogeneity goes a long way towards stabilizing cooperation
(Fig. 2a,c,d).
Although a quantitative analytical theory of this spatial game
seems beyond reach, some important qualitative insights can
nevertheless be secured through a combination of numerical and
analytical examinations. For this purpose, we quantify the most
important departures between an observed spatial pattern and the
corresponding mean-ﬁeld pattern (with the latter deﬁned by the
random redistribution of site qualities and strategies). Important
departures are those that are not only large, but also prevalent; we
measure this by what we call the prevalent-deviation score (PDS)
f log10(f/f^ ) calculated from a conﬁguration’s observed frequency
f and mean-ﬁeld frequency f^ . By observing the frequencies of
every conﬁguration of strategies and site qualities involving two
to ﬁve players, and by determining the resultant PDS values
(Supplementary Note 1), we reveal the common characteristics of
conﬁgurations that are prevalent and strongly deviate from mean-
ﬁeld expectations (Fig. 3).
At high temptation to defect, a rich cooperator is always found
at the core of a cooperating cluster (Figs 1b and 3a,b). In the
star-shaped conﬁguration that has the highest PDS (Fig. 3b), if
c/44b 1 the poor-site cooperators have higher payoffs than
any surrounding poor-site defector, whereas in a homogeneous
environment (c¼ 0) this condition is never met for b 140.
Hence, cooperators on rich sites enhance the payoffs of
neighbouring cooperators on poor sites, and thus allow coopera-
tion to spread in a heterogeneous environment. Our PDS analysis
in Fig. 3a,b thus suggests that cooperators holding on to small
rich islands are the main mechanism through which resource
heterogeneity facilitates the maintenance of cooperation. This
also explains why the highest facilitation of cooperative behaviour
occurs at low values of p (Fig. 2a,d): under those conditions,
rich islands are small, and, thus, are likely to harbour only
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cooperators, whereas the large, rich islands occurring when p is
high are likely to harbour both cooperators and defectors, and
consequently are easily taken over by defectors.
At low temptation, heterogeneity hinders cooperation. When
the temptation to defect is low (corresponding to relatively high
gains from promoting the public good), wealth inequality can
lower cooperation levels (Fig. 2e) compared with a homogeneous
environment. A low, but not vanishing fraction p of rich sites
(Fig. 2b,e) and a high contrast c exacerbate this reduction in
cooperation (Fig. 2e,f). Again, the ﬁve-site conﬁguration with the
highest PDS is star-shaped but now comprise poor-site defectors,
with a rich-site defector at the centre (Fig. 3d). The rich site
stabilizes the others if c41.75/b 1. Even for low temptations,
0ob 1o0.25, this inequality can be satisﬁed already at low
contrast, for c40.4 to c40.75. As for high temptation, the
occupancy of small, rich islands is important (Figs 1b and 3c,d);
now, defectors can cling to these, but are ousted from larger
ones. Analytical results obtained by investigating the dynamics of
small clusters25 corroborate the numerical result, by demon-
strating how such clusters (Supplementary Figs S1 and S2) behave
differently in homogeneous versus heterogeneous environments
(Supplementary Note 2).
Results are robust to alternate model assumptions. The above
results prove to be very robust. Changing the update rule (con-
sidering synchronous and/or deterministic updating instead of
the asynchronous stochastic updating employed for the main
ﬁgures) does not affect our qualitative results (Supplementary
Fig. S3). With deterministic updating, cooperators, at high
temptation to defect, achieve slightly higher abundance than with
stochastic updating (Supplementary Fig. S3a). This is in agree-
ment with other theoretical investigations of cooperation in
structured populations17. At low temptation to defect, the
prevalence of defectors is much higher than with stochastic
updating (Supplementary Fig. S3b). This is because a single
defector amidst cooperators always has a higher payoff than its
neighbours, so the defector can always spread. With stochastic
updating, a single defector can go extinct just by chance. This
explains why full cooperation cannot be achieved with determi-
nistic updating (Supplementary Fig. S3b,f), but readily results
for stochastic updating (Fig. 2e and Supplementary Fig. S3d).
Introduction of non-overlapping generations (synchronous
updating) causes no signiﬁcant quantitative deviation from the
results obtained for overlapping generations (asynchronous
updating; compare Fig. 2d,e with Supplementary Fig. S3c,d, and
Supplementary Fig. S3e,f with Supplementary Fig. S3a,b).
Considering the Moore neighbourhood (eight neighbours), a
random regular network or a scale-free network result in the same
qualitative outcomes (Supplementary Fig. S4). The impact of the
enlarged (Moore) neighbourhood is small. The level of coopera-
tion increases in the heterogeneous high-temptation environment,
when the interactions take place on a random regular graph. In
other words, the randomization of neighbours further increases
the effect of heterogeneity, so that for high temptation even higher
levels of cooperation are achieved (Supplementary Fig. S4c,d).
In contrast, the heterogeneous degree distribution of the scale-free
interaction graph favours defection in heterogeneous environ-
ments (Supplementary Fig. S4e,f). Therefore, the levels of
cooperation achieved in the heterogeneous high-temptation
environment are more modest compared with those observed
on regular lattices, and the drop in the levels of cooperation in the
heterogeneous low-temptation environment is larger.
Moreover, the possibility of erroneous execution of strategies
does not affect the qualitative outcomes (Supplementary Fig. S5).
We can thus conclude that the noise introduced by such errors
does not have any qualitative effects. When both strategies can
err, the quantitative results hardly change for high temptation
(Supplementary Fig. S5a), whereas the negative effects of
environmental heterogeneity are enhanced when the temptation
to defect is low (Supplementary Fig. S5b). At intermediate
frequencies of rich sites, erring defectors can reap a high payoff by
mistakenly cooperating if there are enough cooperators around.
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Figure 1 | Snapshots of the spatial conﬁgurations of cooperators and
defectors. A 30 30 snapshot of spatial conﬁgurations of cooperators
(blue) and defectors (red) of the 100 100 ﬁeld in the spatial two-person
PGG with (b,d) and without (a,c) wealth inequality, with rich sites indicated
with brighter colours. Site qualities and initial strategies are set
independently and at random, with (a,c) a p¼0 and (b,d) p¼0.2 fraction
of rich sites and a 0.5 fraction of cooperators. Portraying the homogeneous
environment as uniformly rich (p¼ 1) or poor (p¼0) is equivalent and can
be used interchangeably. The initial distribution of strategies quickly
changes within 106 steps (middle column), but equilibrium is reached only
after about 5 107 steps (b–d, right column). When the temptation to
defect is high (b 1¼0.7; a,b), cooperation cannot be maintained in the
homogeneous environment (a), whereas it persist in the heterogeneous
environment (b). Note that clusters of cooperators always harbour a rich
cooperator at their core (b). When the temptation to defect is low
(b 1¼0.1, c,d), defectors cannot survive in the homogeneous
environment (c), but they cannot be ousted from the population in the
heterogeneous environment (d). Note that rich defectors at the core of
clusters make it possible for defection to be maintained (d). Other
parameters: c¼ 10 and m¼ 10.
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Such players, however, would still spread their defecting strategy.
When only cooperators can err, the abundance of defectors is
roughly the same for low temptation as in the absence of
errors (Supplementary Fig. S5d). Cooperators, however, are
generally better off if they can occasionally reap the beneﬁt of
defecting, while still propagating their cooperative behaviour
(Supplementary Fig. S5c).
Considering continuous resource levels does not even dis-
cernibly change our quantitative results (Supplementary Fig. S6).
The noise introduced by continuous resource levels has negligible
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Figure 2 | Fraction of cooperators in heterogeneous environments. Equilibrium fractions of cooperators are shown as a function of the fraction p
of rich sites and the contrast c between rich and poor sites. Panels a and b show mean levels of cooperation as a function of p of rich sites at c¼ 9.
Panels c and f show mean levels of cooperation as a function of the contrast c between rich and poor sites at p¼0.1. Panels a–c and f show transect of the
parameter space explored in panels d and e, where the location of these transects is indicated by grey lines. Panels d and e depict the fraction of
cooperators through colour scales from 0 (red) to 1 (blue), based on 10 (a,c,d) or 40 (b,e,f) replicate model runs at each point, with increments of
0.1 in p and of 1 in c. White lines represent iso-wealth curves; along these, the average resource level of sites, pR2þ (1 p)R1, remains constant. Initial
strategies are set at random, with a 0.5 fraction of cooperators. Results are recorded after 5 108 steps. Other parameters: m¼ 10 and b 1¼0.7
(high temptation: a,c,d) or b 1¼0.1 (low temptation; b,e,f).
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Figure 3 | Conﬁgurations with the highest prevalent-deviation score in heterogenous environment. First ten highest-ranking conﬁgurations are shown
for (a,b) two, (c,d) three, (e,f) four and (g,h) ﬁve players. The model is ﬁrst run for 5 107 steps, after which conﬁgurations are recorded every 5 106
steps for a total of 20 recordings. Frequencies belonging to mirror-symmetric and rotationally symmetric conﬁgurations are averaged and reported for one
conﬁguration arbitrarily chosen from the symmetry class. Colour coding as in Fig. 1. Other parameters: m¼ 10 and b 1¼0.7, p¼0.1, c¼ 20 (high
temptation; a,c,e,g) or b 1¼0.1, p¼0.3, c¼6.67 (low temptation, b,d,f,h).
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3453
4 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 4:2453 | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3453 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
& 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.
effect on the outcome, showing that our assumption of only
two resource levels does not affect the generality of the reported
results.
As a further test of robustness, we analyse the heterogeneous
PGG for n¼ 5 players, again ﬁnding qualitatively equivalent
behaviour (Supplementary Fig. S7). Moreover, when we replace
the PD with the Snowdrift Game26,27, an important alternative
for modelling cooperation, we ﬁnd that resource heterogeneity
always favours cooperation (Supplementary Fig. S8).
In summary, we have shown that our results are robust
to a wide variety of changes in key features of our model
(Supplementary Table S1).
Cooperation can emerge from scratch. Our results show that
cooperation can be maintained in a heterogeneous environment
when this is impossible in the corresponding homogeneous
environment. So far, however, we have assumed that players
either always cooperate or always defect. In an attempt to
encompass more real-world complexity, we now extend our
model by allowing gradual evolution in the individual-level
probability of players to cooperate. We can thus show that
cooperation is not only maintained, but can also emerge from
scratch through gradual evolution in heterogeneous environ-
ments initially comprising only defectors (Fig. 4a). In this mixed-
strategy model of gradual evolution, the population-level averages
of the probability to cooperate turn out to be closely similar to the
frequencies of cooperators observed in the simpler, pure-strategy
model (compare Fig. 2d,e with Fig. 4a,e, respectively).
These results can be understood by appreciating that the
cooperative act is an investment towards the objective of being
surrounded by cooperators. Players on rich sites can maintain
this cooperative neighbourhood by being cooperative themselves,
up to the point at which the resultant advantage is balanced by
the danger of facilitating invasion by a less cooperative player
residing on an adjacent rich site.
In a further extension, we analyse the evolution of conditional
strategies, with each player now being characterized by two
continuous variables: the probability to cooperate if the player is
on a rich site, and the probability to cooperate if the player is on a
poor site. Allowing conditional strategies to evolve results in
ampliﬁed effects of heterogeneity. With conditional strategies,
only a little contrast between rich and poor sites (c¼ 1) already
sufﬁces for the population to reap the full beneﬁt of wealth
inequality through increased cooperation (Fig. 4b). Moreover, the
range of fraction p of rich sites over which heterogeneity enables
cooperation is considerably broadened relative to the uncondi-
tional case (Fig. 4b). Remarkably, players evolve a higher
probability to cooperate when situated on poor sites than when
residing on rich sites (compare Fig. 3c,d), with the probability to
cooperate on rich sites increasing, as rich sites become scarce.
Note that when there are very few rich sites, the players on these
sites are more inclined to cooperate and the resultant average level
of cooperation is mainly due to their contributions (compare Fig.
4c,d). At low levels of temptation, populations cease to exhibit full
cooperation when poor sites abound, and this departure grows as
wealth inequality increases (Fig. 4f). In this case, players on rich
sites are reluctant to cooperate when their numbers are low, as
exploitation of their altruistic behaviour leads to elevated
defection. Consequently, the probability of players on rich sites
to cooperate steadily increases with their abundance (Fig. 4g).
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Figure 4 | Evolved propensities to cooperate in heterogeneous environment. Average equilibrium probabilities to cooperate are shown as a function of
the fraction p of rich sites and the contrast c between rich and poor sites. Panels a and e show the evolutionary outcomes for unconditional strategies,
whereas panels b–d and f–h show those outcomes for conditional strategies. In the latter case, the probabilities to cooperate when situated on a rich
or poor site evolve independently. Average equilibrium probabilities to cooperate are shown in panels b and f. The mean equilibrium probabilities of
cooperation of players on rich sites are shown on panels c and g, and the same for players on poor sites in panels d and h. All panels depict the fraction of
cooperators through colour scales from 0 (red) to 1 (blue), based on ﬁve replicate model runs at each point, with increments of 0.1 in p and of 1 in c. Initial
strategies were set to 0, implying defection on both rich and poor sites. As in Fig. 2, white lines represent iso-wealth curves. Results are recorded after
2 109 steps. Other parameters: m¼ 10 and b 1¼0.7 (high temptation; a,c,d) or b 1¼0.1 (low temptation; b,e,f).
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In general, players on poor sites tend to be more cooperative than
players on rich sites. This is because a group of poor-site players can
increase their payoffs more if they become more cooperative,
whereas a group of rich-site players can maintain their competitive
superiority even with a more modest cooperativeness.
Discussion
Resource heterogeneity allows cooperation to persist even when
the temptation to defect is so high that full defection is observed
in the homogeneous case. This key ﬁnding of our study is broadly
related to an earlier research, demonstrating that asymmetries
among players can facilitate the spread of cooperation. Maynard
Smith28, for instance, showed that role asymmetry through the
introduction of the ‘bourgeois’ strategy can lessen aggression in
the Hawk–Dove Game. Moreover, variation in the total number
of interaction links individuals possess on heterogeneous
interaction graphs results in elevated levels of cooperation20,29.
This is because some individuals can then reap beneﬁts from
many interactions, resulting in inequalities in the maximal
beneﬁts of players30. Similarly, the existence of role models
(individuals whose successes are copied more often than those of
others) can stabilize cooperation31,32, but see Kim et al.33 Thus,
differences among individuals appear to be an important, and as
yet insufﬁciently studied, determinant of the cooperation level a
society can attain.
Interpreting our results in a wider context, it is tempting to ask
whether they might contribute an explanatory facet to the
scientiﬁc understanding of more or less egalitarian social
norms34. Our results suggest that the level of cooperation can
be managed by changing the distribution of wealth (moving along
the iso-wealth curves in Figs 2 and 3). Although differences
among individuals are pervasive in the living world and in human
societies, social norms can either counter or exacerbate them.
Speciﬁcally, in situations in which the temptation to defect is high
(as gains from promoting the public good are low), it will always
be possible to increase the levels of cooperation by increasing
wealth inequality (Figs 2d and 3a,b). On the other hand,
in situations in which gains from promoting the public good
are high (and the temptation to defect thus is low), wealth
inequalities lead to decreased levels of cooperation (Figs 2e and
3e,f). In the latter case, the evolution of inequality aversion,
promoting an egalitarian society, can considerably increase levels
of cooperation by decreasing wealth inequalities, ultimately
leading to a situation in which all members of a population
receive the same share of resources.
Egalitarian motives in humans are widespread and are
exhibited from a very early age35–37. Fehr and Schmidt38 have
thus suggested equity as a key factor in strengthening human
cooperation and in explaining the prevalence of cooperation in
our species34,39. The case for animals having inequality aversion
is less strong. Some studies have documented strong reactions by
animals towards what they perceive as inequity40–43; yet, the
larger shares accrued by socially dominant individuals are seldom
questioned by other individuals41 and the resultant social
disapproval is even less strong towards members of the same
social group42. On the other hand, some studies found that great
apes are true rational maximizers when it comes to their feeding
options44,45 and no inequality aversion could be found among
them. If we account for the facts that great apes and humans both
exhibit cooperative behaviour46, but human cooperation is much
more pervasive47 and efﬁcient at generating public goods, we can
arrive at the conclusion that (early) humans and great apes are
positioned on opposite sides of the threshold in the efﬁciency of
public-good generation; below this threshold heterogeneity and
inequity are beneﬁcial, whereas above this threshold homogeneity
and equity should be the norm (Fig. 2d,e). Examples for such
disparate efﬁciencies abound, for example, chimpanzees, can
cooperatively hunt only small monkeys48, whereas human
hunters can take down large preys49; likewise, chimpanzees
physically attack only lonely individuals from other bands,
whereas humans regularly engage in warfare50. This suggests that
cooperation was a necessity in the evolutionary past of our
species, and that the efﬁciency of our cooperation has co-evolved
with our egalitarian motives.
Although humans appear to have been fully egalitarian at the
hunter–gatherer stage of cultural evolution51, and although
contemporary hunter–gatherer societies still exhibit low levels of
wealth inequality52, industrial and post-industrial societies have
varied levels of wealth inequality53 and also show variation in the
level of observable cooperative tendencies54–56. This suggests that
our results might help explain the re-emergence of inequality
during the Holocene57. As human societies became larger, and
mechanisms limited to enabling the maintenance of cooperation in
small-scale societies (like peer reputation and peer punishment55)
thus lost their effectiveness, institutions emerged that allowed
enforcing cooperative norms at a cost58,59. Maintaining the same
level of cooperation at the lower efﬁciency implied by the involved
cost required elevated wealth inequality, which indeed prevailed for
hundreds of years57. Today we hopefully are in the middle of a new
transition in the cultural evolution of our species, back to more
egalitarian societies. Indeed, modern Western societies exhibit high
levels of cooperativeness56 coupled with low wealth inequalities
comparable to those of the hunter–gatherers52. Our model-based
analyses suggest that this transition could have come about by an
increased effectiveness of public-good generation. Egalitarianism, a
unique human trait, can once more hold sway in our societies.
Methods
Payoff matrix. The payoff matrix (Table 1) is obtained in four steps. First, players
on a poor site can invest R1, whereas players on a rich site can invest R2; coop-
erators invest, whereas defectors do not. The pooled investments are multiplied by
r and then evenly distributed among the two players. Second, payoffs are nor-
malized by adjusting the payoff baseline so that a cooperator on a poor site playing
against a defector on a poor site receives a payoff of 0. Third, payoffs are nor-
malized by adjusting the payoff unit, so that two cooperators on poor sites playing
against each other will each receive a payoff of 1. These two normalizations have no
bearing on game dynamics. Fourth, the deﬁnitions b¼ 2/r and c¼ (R2R1)/R1 are
applied to arrive at the payoff matrix shown below. Note that switching coop-
eration to defection in this matrix always increases a player’s payoff by b 1 on a
poor site and by (cþ 1)(b 1) on a rich site, irrespective of the partner’s strategy or
site quality. Note also that the site quality of partners affects a player’s payoff only
when their partners cooperate, but not when they defect.
Game dynamics. Our spatial game dynamics are analogous to those analysed, for
example, by Nowak et al.4 Individual players reside on sites of a 100 100 square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Updating is asynchronous, by randomly
choosing a focal site to be updated in each step. The player on this focal site then
plays the game described in the main text with all four nearest neighbours, and
Table 1 | Payoff matrix of the two-person Public Good Game
with wealth inequality.
First player Second player
Rich site Poor site
Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect
Rich site
Cooperate 2cþ 1 c cþ 1 c
Defect bcþ bþ c bcþ b 1 bcþ b bcþ b 1
Poor site
Cooperate cþ 1 0 1 0
Defect bþ c b 1 b b 1
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these neighbours in turn play it with their four nearest neighbours. The focal site is
held by the focal player, or is taken over by its neighbours, with probabilities
proportional to their payoffs raised to the power of m (resulting in what is known
as proportional or imitation updating27), which thus characterizes the degree of
stochasticity in the contest for a site4. When a site’s occupancy changes, the payoffs
of the focal player and its neighbours are updated.
Evolutionary dynamics. In our evolutionary analysis, the game dynamics are as
described above, except that the lattice size is reduced to 64 64 sites to keep
computation time manageable. Each player’s strategy is given by his or her
probability to cooperate in an interaction. If a site’s occupancy changes, there is a
5% chance that the focal player’s strategy is mutated. The mutated strategy is
chosen randomly from the interval [x 0.05, xþ 0.05], where x is the strategy
before mutation, and any mutated strategy outside the interval [0,1] is reset to the
corresponding boundary. Evolutionary dynamics start with every player being a
defector, implying a vanishing probability to cooperate. We also allow strategies to
be conditional on the quality of the occupied site, resulting in two cooperation
probabilities that can evolve independently. Upon mutation, one of these two
probabilities is chosen at random and is changed as described above.
Robustness checks. Many alternate model assumptions are examined. With
asynchronous deterministic updating, the player with the highest payoff always
wins the local competition, which is equivalent to m-N. This update rule is
called ‘best takes over’26. With synchronous stochastic updating, all players’ payoffs
and strategies are updated at the same time. This corresponds to the dynamics of a
population with non-overlapping generations. In practice, synchronous updating is
carried out by determining the outcome of competition based on the state of a site
at time t, and continuing with the winners of all corresponding local competitions
at time tþ 1. With synchronous deterministic updating, the player with the highest
payoff always wins the local competition and all players’ payoffs and strategies are
updated at the same time.
In the model variant in which the interaction structure is described by the Moore
neighbourhood, each player plays with its eight neighbours, which include the four
orthogonal and the four diagonal neighbours. In the case when interactions take
place on a random regular graph, the neighbourhood relations are fully randomized
at the beginning of each model run. This means that each player has k¼ 4
neighbours, but these players can be located anywhere on the original lattice. The
scale-free graphs are generated by the Albert–Baraba´si method60 at the beginning of
each model run. In this case, on average, each player has k¼ 4 neighbours, but the
actual numbers of neighbours follow a power-law distribution. Payoffs are scaled to
the actual number of neighbours before comparing them in competition.
Erroneous strategy execution is modelled as follows: in each individual game,
each player has a small probability (e¼ 0.01) accidentally to play the opposite
strategy (that is, cooperators defect, whereas defectors cooperate). Of course, such
an event only affects strategy execution at one moment but never lastingly changes
the strategy itself. As a further test, we examine what happens if defectors would
not, by mistake, behave as cooperators. We, therefore, also consider a setup in
which cooperators can erroneously defect, whereas defectors never cooperate. As
players in our model do not base their behaviours on the behaviours perceived in
their neighbours, erroneous perception need not be considered.
Continuous levels of resources are incorporated by considering a continuous
bimodal distribution of resources instead of just two discrete levels of resources.
Speciﬁcally, resources are either low, R1þ r, or high, R2þr, where r is a random
number drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and s.d. s. Payoffs are
calculated by pooling the available resources from cooperators, dividing by b¼ 2/r
(see the payoff matrix section of the Methods), and giving the result to both
participant of the game. Defectors withhold their resources.
In the heterogeneous Snowdrift Game, each player can gain a beneﬁt from
cooperation, b1 on rich sites or b2 on poor sites (with b14b2), and the cost of
cooperation is c0 for any player. In the Snowdrift Game, the cost is halved when
both players cooperate, and the beneﬁt is reaped when at least one of the players
cooperates. We use synchronous stochastic updating, as described above.
The ﬁve-player PGG is a generalization of the two-player PGG, in which a
player and N 1 of its neighbours constitute a group playing a round of the PGG.
As in the basic game, players on poor sites can invest R1, whereas players on rich
sites can invest R2; cooperators invest, whereas defectors do not. The pooled
investments are multiplied by r and are then evenly distributed among the N
players. After applying the deﬁnition of contrast, c¼ (R2R1)/R1, and normalizing
payoffs by R1, we obtain the payoff of a cooperator as P¼ r(kpoorþ (cþ 1)krich)/N,
where kpoor and krich are the numbers of cooperators within the group situated on
poor and rich sites, respectively. Analogously, the payoff of a defector is Pþ 1 on a
poor site and Pþ (cþ 1) on a rich site.
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